# **Contact Centres:** The new frontier in fraud prevention

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### Section 1: About the survey



### Foreword

Fraud costs the UK economy billions. A focus on early signs of fraud in contact centres could help curb this growing threat.

For individual victims, fraud is felt when money is taken from their account, a charge is made to their card, or someone else uses their details to obtain a loan. Businesses also focus on financial loss – the 'cash-out' stage of the fraud life cycle. But, in fact, fraud begins much earlier, often with a call to a contact centre. Smartnumbers' in-house data shows that 28% of activity flagged by our systems is due to 'reconnaissance' attempts, while 59% is 'set-up' related.

These are vital parts of the process, when fraudsters validate stolen data or steal more information to prepare their attacks. According to UKFinance, a trade association for the banking and financial services sector, the amount stolen through fraud in the UK in 2023 was  $\pm$ 1.17 billion. Reducing that figure means we have to take seriously the wider role of contact centres in the fraud life cycle.

If businesses continue to measure and report fraud levels by financial transactions, rather than preventing customer data loss, they won't have a thorough understanding of what's going on and will miss critical insight for preventing fraud altogether. To gain a clear picture of the scale of fraud that organisations are currently aware of in the contact centre, we partnered with Opinion Matters to conduct an independent survey.

We're delighted to share the findings with you.

Jamie Melling Smartnumbers Chief Executive Officer



The amount stolen through fraud in the UK in 2023 was £1.17 billion.

Reducing that figure means we have to take seriously the wider role of contact centres in the fraud life cycle.

### Section 1: About the survey

# Survey quick guide

### **Contact centres:** The new frontier in fraud prevention



Organisations need to stop focusing solely on the financial loss and start addressing data loss through reconnaissance, which are precursors to bigger fraud incidents.

Matthew Addison Smartnumbers Chief Revenue Officer



Fraud is typically recognised at the point of financial loss. But fraud begins much earlier, often with a call to a contact centre. Activity flagged by Smartnumbers tells us:

### 04 Easy fraud targets

Travel sector respondents report particularly high fraud activity in both IVR (66%) and with contact centre agents (55%), suggesting fraudsters are constantly looking for softer targets.

### 07

Reactive fraud prevention

Fewer than half have automated frauddetection methods in the contact centre, such as flagging incoming calls from blacklisted numbers (44%) or flagging incoming calls because of unusual behaviour (39%).



Set Up

66%

55%

Due to

attempts

٧X

44%

### Missed fraud insight

02

When businesses measure and report fraud levels by financial transactions. rather than preventing customer data loss, they miss critical insight for preventing fraud altogether.

**Exploiting humans** 

### Fraud is widespread

06

More than 85% of survey respondents report high fraud-related activity across all business sectors, with telephony channels being just as vulnerable as online or mobile channels.

The most common fraudster tactics are tricking agents (social engineering), reported by 40% of respondents; and using devices to change the caller's voice, reported by 32%.

### 08

#### Data sharing is key

There is a hesitancy to share fraud intelligence - because of fears about data quality, giving away a competitive advantage or concerns about perception. But fraud threatens entire sectors, not just a few companies.

# 40% ultu 32%

### Beware the bots

When businesses measure and report fraud levels by financial transactions, rather than preventing customer data loss, they miss critical insight for preventing fraud altogether.

#### Moving beyond financial loss

A focus on preventing data leakage is key to avoiding larger financial losses overall. Counter-fraud teams, across all sectors, must prioritise the protection of customer data to make it harder for criminals to exploit such a vital resource.



+85%

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### Section 1: About the survey

# Our methodology






# Fraud seen in all sectors

There's no doubt that fraudulent activity is widespread. The survey covered 250 UK-based senior decision-makers dealing with fraud in organisations with large contact centres in the financial services, retail, travel and telecoms sectors. More than 85% of respondents report high fraud-related activity across all business sectors, with telephony channels being just as vulnerable as online or mobile channels.

The research suggests that organisations do understand that contact centres are a target. "The awareness of vulnerabilities within contact centres across multiple sectors is a particularly interesting part of the survey results," says Matthew Addison, Chief Revenue Office at Sumartnumbers. Certain industries, such as travel, report particularly high fraud activity in both interactive voice response (IVR) at nearly 97% and with contact centre agents (92%).

"Fraudsters are constantly looking for softer targets in sectors like retail or airlines, where they can conduct last-minute attacks such as fraudulent ticket purchases," says Tim Burton, chief product and success officer at Smartnumbers

He explains that, for example, cardholder validation by card issuers and passenger validation by airlines are not as joined up as they should be. Fraudsters exploit this by purchasing a last-minute flight using stolen financial details, or by modifying passenger information shortly before a flight takes off, leaving a narrow window for collaboration to spot the fraud.



Fraudsters are constantly looking for softer targets in sectors like retail or airlines, where they can conduct last-minute attacks such as fraudulent ticket purchases




Tim Burton Smartnumbers Chief Product and Success Officer

# Humans are an easy target

Fraudsters are becoming more skilled at manipulating agents into giving away information or carrying out small account changes. These are early signs of fraud that often happen long before the cash-out stage.

Tim Burton Smartnumbers Chief Product and Success Officer



Human vulnerabilities are easy to exploit, and this was clear in the survey results. Among the most common fraudster tactics are tricking agents (social engineering), which was reported by 40% of respondents, and using devices to change the caller's voice, reported by 32%. Agents are trained to be helpful and they're under time pressure, which means they might unwittingly overlook security rules for a fraudster who they think is a genuine customer with a difficult problem.

Suppressing notifications, for example, by switching to paperless statement,s was a tactic reported by 31% of respondents. "Fraudsters are becoming more skilled at manipulating agents into giving away information or carrying out small account changes. These are early signs of fraud that often happen long before the cash-out stage," Burton explains.

Yet human-to-human fraud is the tip of the iceberg and – with call recording relatively easy to track and understand – it's not scalable. It's the bots we should be scared of. As with many legitimate organisations, fraudsters are turning to automation technology to increase the speed and volume of their activity.

## **Beware the bots**

Mass attacks on multiple companies in multiple sectors use bots to target IVRs and identify high-value accounts to ensure maximum return on fraud. For example, if a fraudster knows the target's birth year and birth month, they can use a bot to call up to 31 times. This gives them the chance to also uncover the correct day of birth, which can be used in the next stage of the process.

"Fraudsters exploit the IVR by making numerous attempts to extract or validate information, a process that can take multiple calls before they get what they need," says Addison. "This activity is often invisible to businesses".

Fraudsters exploit the IVR by making numerous attempts to extract or validate information, a process that can take multiple calls before they get what they need. This activity is often invisible to businesses.

Matthew Addison Smartnumbers Chief Revenue Officer

# **Current fraud-prevention gaps**

The lack of integration between fraud and contact-centre teams means they're not working towards the same goal.



Tim Burton Smartnumbers Chief Product and Success Officer

44% Flagging calls from blacklisted numbers Flagging calls with 39% unusual behaviours

Yet many companies still take a reactive approach to fraud. Fewer than half of those surveyed have automated fraud-detection methods in the contact centre, such as flagging incoming calls from blacklisted numbers (44%) or flagging incoming calls because of unusual behaviour, such as making multiple calls in quick succession (39%).

Many are relying instead on outdated or manual processes. Even processes that can be automated easily today are sometimes still done manually. For example, some large organisations continue to use sticky notes on agents' desktops to flag blacklisted numbers. Organisations are not always linking the vital data they do have or ensuring it's distributed to those who need it. Fraud signals – such as multiple calls within a short time or calls from withheld or blacklisted numbers – should be fed into overall fraudprevention strategies because they're signs of reconnaissance or data acquisition.

But this data is not always linked to the downstream fraud that occurs later in other channels. "The lack of integration between fraud and contact-centre teams means they're not working towards the same goal," Burton says.


## Missed opportunities for data sharing

Data sharing is key because fraudsters commonly exploit weaknesses in one organisation or channel to gather the data needed to attack another target. While 95% of businesses share some form of contact centre fraud data internally and externally, approximately half have formal processes for this.

Externally, there is also a hesitancy to share fraud intelligence – because of fears about data quality, giving away a competitive advantage or concerns about perception. But fraud threatens entire sectors, not just a few companies.

Sharing should be easy and standard practice, because insights about fraudsters' activities and behaviour patterns could make everyone safer. For example, if company A shares fraud intelligence that helps company B to strengthen its defences, then both companies might be more secure.

Ironically, fraudsters are proactive in sharing information. Some gangs will specialise in verifying account details, for example, and then sell this – now more valuable – data to other fraudsters with a greater capability to exploit it.



# Moving beyond financial loss

When organisations prioritise and measure fraud prevention at the financial transaction stage, they overlook the critical role that protecting customer data plays in preventing fraud. But a focus on preventing data leakage is key to avoiding larger financial losses overall.

In fact, better awareness at this stage can make it easier to catch fraudsters. An organisation that has the tools to identify suspicious data-gathering activity can flag the accounts being targeted so its fraud-prevention team can watch those accounts. The fraudsters can then be caught in the act when they try to complete the transaction.

Allowing the cycle to safely play out like this means organisations learn more. It also makes it easier to attach a fiscal value to the fraud that's been prevented. Some top retail banks we work with are already doing this. "By using early-warning systems and sharing fraud intelligence, companies can spot suspicious activity sooner," Burton says. "This means less damage and fewer opportunities for fraudsters to exploit data across multiple channels."

Without proactive prevention measures, including solutions to automate detection and prevent reconnaissance activity, fraud will continue to cost the economy billions in stolen revenue. But focusing on the financial loss alone can only take us so far. Counter-fraud teams, across all sectors, must prioritise the protection of customer data to make it harder for criminals to exploit such

a vital resource.



By using early-warning systems and sharing fraud intelligence, companies can spot suspicious activity sooner. This means less damage and fewer opportunities for fraudsters to exploit data across multiple channels.



Tim Burton Smartnumbers Chief Product and Success Officer



### All responses:

# Q1: Channels

Thinking about the different ways fraudsters attempt to target/access customer accounts in your organisation, what levels of activity, if any, do you see in the following customer channel(s)?

- More than 85% of respondents report high fraud-related activity across all business sectors, with telephony channels being just as vulnerable as online or mobile channels.
- Clearly organisations understand that fraudsters exploit the contact centre but may lack the visibility provided by technology to detect the scale of fraud (based on later responses).

Online & Website		90.4%
Mobile App		89.2%
Contact Centre IVR	СР	89.6%
Contact Centre Call Agent	$\mathbf{O}$	86.8%
Customer Al Chat	¢	89.2%
Branch & Store		85.6%
	High-level activity reported in contact centres 88%	

### Section 3: Survey in detail

# Q1: Channels

Thinking about the different ways fraudsters attempt to target/access customer accounts in your organisation, what levels of activity, if any, do you see in the following customer channel(s)?

- In Financial Services, the majority of respondants reported equally high actiity in online and IVR channels.
- Travel and transport sector had the highest number respondents reporting high levels of fraud across all channels. Almost 97% of respondents reported high activity in the IVR.



Financial Services

Retail





IT and Telecoms (including mobile)

Travel and Transport







### By company size:

# Q1: Channels


Thinking about the different ways fraudsters attempt to target/access customer accounts in your organisation, what levels of activity, if any, do you see in the following customer channel(s)?







1000+ employees



# **Q2: Fraudster tactics**

All responses:

Thinking about fraudulent activity in your organisation's contact centres in the last 12 months, which fraudster tactics, if any, are the most common?

- Social engineering of agents, the use of voice changers and the suppression of customer notifications, are the top three most commonly reported tactics used by fraudsters to target contact centre.
- These tactics are also the most easy to detect, which (in our experience) suggests contact centre fraud is being under-reported.

#### Impersonating customers Disauisina uļu 32.0% their voice Suppressing notifications 30.8% by going paperless Fraudulent activity spikes 29.6% following data breach Al attacks on 29.2% chat channels Boaus 27.2% applications Repeated calls from 26.8% same fraudster APP scam payments to 26.4% fraudster's account Same fraudsters target 25.6% multiple customers Changing customers' 25.6% account details **Registering customers'** 24.8% voice biometrics **Targeting IVR for** 23.2% customer information


40.4%

### By industry sector:

# **Q2: Fraudster tactics**

Thinking about fraudulent activity in your organisation's contact centres in the last 12 months, which fraudster tactics, if any, are the most common?

#### Financial Services





#### IT and Telecoms (including mobile)

46.0%

Impersonating customers	0 19	46.0
Disguising their voice	aja.	28.6%
Suppressing notifications by going paperless	Ŕ	30.2%
Fraudulent activity spikes following data breach	atth	34.9%
Al attacks on chat channels	ė	31.7%
Bogus applications	$\boxtimes$	31.7%
Repeated calls from same fraudster	88	27.0%
APP scam payments to fraudster's account	$\odot$	27.0%
Same fraudsters target multiple customers	»ငိုင္ရိ	28.6%
Changing customers' account details	<u>AX</u>	25.4%
Registering customers' voice biometrics		30.2%
Targeting IVR for customer information	-∱-ħ	27.0%


### By industry sector:

# **Q2: Fraudster tactics**

Thinking about fraudulent activity in your organisation's contact centres in the last 12 months, which fraudster tactics, if any, are the most common?



#### Travel and Transport






### By company size:

# **Q2: Fraudster tactics**

Thinking about fraudulent activity in your organisation's contact centres in the last 12 months, which fraudster tactics, if any, are the most common?

	500-799 em	ployees	800-99
Impersonating customers	<u>ای</u>	44.4%	آي ا
Disguising their voice	ajia T	35.2%	
Suppressing notifications by going paperless	Ŵ	37.0%	Ś
Fraudulent activity spikes following data breach	ath	30.6%	atth
Al attacks on chat channels	ė	29.6%	ė
Bogus applications	$\mathbf{x}$	25.9%	$\mathbf{x}$
Repeated calls from same fraudster	00 00	21.3%	00
APP scam payments to fraudster's account	$\odot$	29.6%	
Same fraudsters target multiple customers	»ĉĉ	28.7%	»ĉĉ
Changing customers' account details	<u>AX</u>	22.2%	
Registering customers' voice biometrics	<u>njo</u>	29.6%	<u></u>
Targeting IVR for customer information	-∑→≛	24.1%	-\$→*
	С	)	(

800-999 en	nployees		
0 10		3	3.3%
ajio.		27.3%	
Ŵ		3	3.3%
allh	24	.2%	
ė		27.3%	
$\overline{\mathbf{X}}$			36.4%
00 00			39.4%
$\odot$	24	<b>.2%</b>	
»ဂိဂိ	21.2	%	
<u>*×</u>		27.3%	
<u>*×</u>		27.3% 30.3	3%
_	18.2%		3%



# Section 3: Survey in detail

Considering some of the different counter-fraud focus areas and approaches available in the contact centre, please select the statement which best describes where you are at with your adoption/implementation of each of the following:

- The most commonly reported counter-fraud controls used to secure the contact centre:
  - training agents to avoid social engineering attacks
  - sharing intelligence
  - flagging calls from blacklisted numbers

### Voice biometric

All responses: Implemented already

Multi-factor authentication

analysis

Facial recognition technology

Video authentication

Flagging calls from blacklisted numbers

Flagging calls from spoofed or withheld numbers


Flagging calls with unusual behaviours

Access to flagged numbers from other organisations

Access to fraudster intelligence from other organisations

Knowledge based authentication

Contact centre agent training on fraudster techniques



# **Q3: Detection**

Considering some of the different counter-fraud focus areas and approaches available in the contact centre, please select the statement which best describes where you are at with your adoption/implementation of each of the following:

- A higher proportion of respondents from Financial Services report the adoption of agent training, KBAs and shared databases.
- IT and Telecoms have gone for adoption of multi-factor authentication, facial recognition, and flagging calls was reported by a higher percentage of IT and Telecoms respondents.

#### Financial Services

Video

By industry sector: Implemented already





#### IT and Telecoms (including mobile)





Retail

# **Q3: Detection**


Considering some of the different counter-fraud focus areas and approaches available in the contact centre, please select the statement which best describes where you are at with your adoption/implementation of each of the following:

 Respondents from retail and travel sectors report especially high adoption of the range of controls.

#### Voice biometric 38.7% analysis Multi-factor 54.8% authentication Facial recognition technology Video authentication Flagging calls from blacklisted numbers Flagging calls from spoofed or withheld numbers Flagging calls with 41.9% unusual behaviours Access to flagged numbers 0 54.8% from other organisations Access to fraudster intelligence 41.9% from other organisations Knowledge based authentication Contact centre agent training on fraudster techniques

#### Travel and Transport

62.9%





# **Q3: Detection**

Considering some of the different counter-fraud focus areas and approaches available in the contact centre, please select the statement which best describes where you are at with your adoption/implementation of each of the following:

- · Respondents from larger organisations are more likely to report the adoption of a particular control, such as flagging blacklisted numbers and sharing intelligence.
- A higher proportion of respondents from smaller organisations report the adoption of video or facial recognition technology.


	500-799 employees	
Voice biometric analysis		33.3%
Multi-factor authentication	2	32.4%
Facial recognition technology	2	39.8%
Video authentication	<u>F1</u>	38.0%
Flagging calls from blacklisted numbers		38.0%
Flagging calls from spoofed or withheld numbers	<u>v?</u>	33.3%
Flagging calls with unusual behaviours	<u>v</u>	31.5%
Access to flagged numbers from other organisations	6	38.9%
Access to fraudster intelligence from other organisations		31.5%
Knowledge based authentication	₽	43.5
Contact centre agent training on fraudster techniques	Θ	40.7%

43.5%

By company size: Implemented already

800	-999 emplo	yees		
	12.1%			
2			30	.3%
$\otimes$	9.1%			
<u>*/</u>				39.4%
<u>•×</u>			27.3%	6
<u>, ?</u>			3	3.3%
<u>.</u>		2	4.2%	
$\odot$				36.4%
(		2	4.2%	
₫.		2	4.2%	
			27.3%	6
	$\frown$			

#### 1000+ employees



# **Q4: Sharing intel**

When it comes to sharing of telephony fraud intelligence inside and outside your organisation, how often, if ever, do you carry out the following datasharing practices in your organisation?

 Almost all respondents, across all sectors, report that they often share (always or sometimes) telephony fraud intelligence within their organisation, but they do not always have a formal process in place. Sharing intel within your organisation

Sharing intel with others within your sector

Sharing intel with others outside your sector

Sharing intel with organised crime prevention agencies



### By industry sector: Sharing data often

Financial Services

Datai

# **Q4: Sharing intel**

When it comes to sharing of telephony fraud intelligence inside and outside your organisation, how often, if ever, do you carry out the following datasharing practices in your organisation?

- In Financial Services the most respondents
  report sharing with other sectors.
- In IT and Telecoms, the most respondents report sharing intel with both within the organisation and with organised crime prevention agencies.
- In retail, ALL respondents reported they
  often share intel within the sector.
- In Travel and Transport the most respondents share within the organisation and within sector.

Sharing intel within your organisation		92.1%
Sharing intel with others within your sector	A	90.5%
Sharing intel with others outside your sector		93.7%
Sharing intel with organised crime prevention agencies		92.1%



Sharing intel within your organisation		96.8%
Sharing intel with others within your sector		100.0%
Sharing intel with others outside your sector	<u>الم</u>	98.4%
Sharing intel with organised crime prevention agencies		95.2%

#### IT and Telecoms (including mobile)

Travel and Transport

Sharing intel within your organisation	P	93.7%
Sharing intel with others within your sector	<u>ه</u> ۸	90.5%
Sharing intel with others outside your sector		92.1%
Sharing intel with organised crime prevention agencies		93.7%




Sharing intel within your organisation		98.4%
Sharing intel with others within your sector	۲	98.4%
Sharing intel with others outside your sector		96.8%
Sharing intel with organised crime prevention agencies		96.8%




# **Q4: Sharing intel**

When it comes to sharing of telephony fraud intelligence inside and outside your organisation, how often, if ever, do you carry out the following datasharing practices in your organisation?

#### 500-799 employees






### All responses:

# **Q5: Sharing externally**

When external intelligence sharing does NOT take place, if ever, what are the reasons, if any, for this?

- The most commonly reported concerns around data sharing are that data isn't complete (44%), or that there will be a negative impact on reputation or data privacy concerns.
- A high proportion of respondents appeared to be concerned about the negative impact on the company or that competitors may take advantage.




### By industry sector:

Financial Services

# **Q5: Sharing externally**

When external intelligence sharing does NOT take place, if ever, what are the reasons, if any, for this?




#### IT and Telecoms (including mobile)



### By industry sector:

# **Q5: Sharing externally**

When external intelligence sharing does NOT take place, if ever, what are the reasons, if any, for this?




#### Travel and Transport

Data not always complete	?	41.9%
Might have an impact on company reputation	$\underbrace{\bigstar}_{\bowtie}$	41.9%
Data privacy issues, GDPR restrictions	*00** 0*000 0*000 *00* *0**0	40.3%
Unwilling to share with competitors	×	37.1%
Not 100% sure of data accuracy	<u>**?</u>	38.7%
No easy, secure way to share information	<u> </u>	38.7%
N/A: We always share intelligence	⊙⁄ 1.6%	
N/A: Does not apply	⊗ 0.0%	
Prefer not to say/ Unsure	× 0.0%	
	(FS)	

### By company size:


# **Q5: Sharing externally**

When external intelligence sharing does NOT take place, if ever, what are the reasons, if any, for this?



### Section 3: Survey in detail

## **About Smartnumbers**



# Fight fraud. Protect the contact centre. Contact us for more information.



**5** smartnumbers